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Note
BAILEY v. UNITED STATES: DRAWING AN EXCEPTION IN THE
CONTEXT OF OFF-PREMISES DETENTIONS INCIDENT TO
SEARCH WARRANTS
CHRISTOPHER CHAULK
In Bailey v. United States,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
considered whether the detention of a recent occupant of a premises subject
to a lawful search warrant one mile away from the premises violated the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures,2 or was a
permissible extension of Michigan v. Summers.3 The Court concluded that
the off-premises detention did not serve the law enforcement interests
underpinning the Court’s decision in Summers.4 The Court then articulated
a spatial limit to Summers: officers cannot detain occupants beyond “the
immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.”5 The majority correctly
crafted this line to ensure that police had adequate power to detain insofar
as the detention served the underlying interest in the “safe and efficient
execution of the search warrant.”6 Moreover, the majority communicated a
flexible standard for lower courts to apply and adapt to the particular
circumstances of a given case.7 Justice Scalia, in concurrence, assisted the
Court by clarifying the proper application and scope of a Summers
detention in light of the conflicting interpretations of Summers among the
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1. 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. 452 U.S. 692 (1981). In Michigan v. Summers, the Court held that a valid search warrant
“implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a
proper search is conducted.” Id. at 705. See infra Part II.C.1.
4. Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1041. The three law enforcement interests are “officer safety,
facilitating the completion of the search, and preventing flight.” Id. at 1038.
5. Id. at 1042.
6. Id. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
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federal courts of appeals.8 By refusing to uphold Bailey’s detention as
reasonable, the Court confirmed that when it considers exceptions to
traditional Fourth Amendment rules, the Court will maintain the scope of
the exception narrowly and rigorously analyze any purported law
enforcement interests involved to ensure the exception rests on appropriate
justifications.9
I. THE CASE
On July 28, 2005, police obtained a warrant to search for a handgun in
the basement apartment of a house located at 103 Lake Drive in
Wyandanch, New York (“the residence”).10 While conducting presearch
surveillance of the area, two police officers observed two men appear to
depart from the residence, leave the gated area leading to the basement
apartment, and enter a car parked in the driveway. 11 Both men matched the
physical description a confidential informant had provided.12 The officers
decided not to detain the men out of concerns for safety and preserving any
potential evidence.13 Instead, the officers followed the vehicle and stopped
the men about one mile from the residence.14
The officers ordered the men out of the car and checked them for
weapons.15 They found only keys and a wallet on the driver.16 Upon
questioning the men, the officers learned the driver’s name was Chunon
Bailey and that he lived at 103 Lake Drive.17 When one of the officers
inspected Bailey’s license, however, he noticed the address was not 103
Lake Drive in Wyandanch, New York, but rather an address in Bay Shore,
New York.18 The officer recalled that their confidential informant had
stated that the person living at 103 Lake Drive, from whom the informant

8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. See infra Part IV.D.
10. United States v. Bailey, 468 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 652 F.3d 197
(2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id. (“[T]he detectives were concerned that, if any people who remained inside the
residence saw that individuals leaving the residence were being stopped, they could arm
themselves or destroy evidence prior to the search.”).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 377 (noting that since the search warrant was for a handgun, the officers were
“particularly concerned” that the men might have weapons).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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had bought drugs, formerly lived in Bay Shore.19 The officers then
handcuffed Bailey and the passenger.20 When Bailey questioned the reason
for his arrest,21 the officers informed him that he was being detained
pursuant to the execution of a search warrant at his apartment.22 Bailey
then stated he was not cooperating, did not live at 103 Lake Drive, and
anything found there did not belong to him.23 The officers kept Bailey’s
keys, then called another officer to return the men to the residence.24 Less
than ten minutes passed from Bailey’s initial stop to his return to the
residence.25 Both men were arrested after a search of the residence revealed
drugs and a gun.26
Prior to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, Bailey moved to suppress the statements he made to the
officers after being detained, as well as his key to the residence.27 The
district court denied Bailey’s motion28 and upheld the officers’ actions
under Michigan v. Summers and, alternatively, Terry v. Ohio.29 The district
court first reasoned that no binding authority prohibited police from
detaining an occupant during a valid search of the premises “when the
occupant is found and detained outside the residence.”30 The district court
then explained that the officers acted in a manner consistent with “[a]t least
two” of the three law enforcement interests that justified the detention
upheld by the Supreme Court in Summers, namely, preventing the occupant
from fleeing and protecting the officers from harm. 31 Ultimately, the
district court found the officers detained Bailey “at the earliest practicable
location that was consistent with the safety and security of the officers and

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 377 n.3.
26. Id. at 377.
27. Id. at 375–76.
28. Id. at 378.
29. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also Bailey, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (“Even if there was no
authority for the detention under Summers, the Court finds that the stop of the defendant’s car and
brief detention during the search were supported by reasonable suspicion and were lawful under
Terry.”); see also infra Part II.A.
30. Bailey, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
31. See id. (noting the officers’ testimony that “they wanted to detain Bailey as he left the
residence pending execution of the search, but did not do so immediately because of concerns
about the effect that such a detention would have on officer safety, as well as the potential
destruction of evidence”).
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the public”;32 if the officers were required to detain Bailey immediately
outside the residence, the officers could have “jeopardize[d] the search or
endanger[ed] [their] lives.”33 Bailey was subsequently convicted of three
charges involving possession of drugs and a firearm.34
Bailey appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit by arguing that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.35 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court by
reasoning that the three law enforcement interests “at stake” in Summers
compelled a limited intrusion of Bailey, namely, the interests in protecting
the officers, preserving the evidence, and completing the search.36 The
Second Circuit also explained that if it were to deny officers this power to
detain, officers would be left with a “Hobson’s choice,” that is, the choice
between detaining the individual but risking their own lives and the
evidence, or declining to detain the individual only to obtain evidence that
would give them sufficient cause to arrest after he had already departed. 37
Moreover, the Second Circuit found that “the officers acted as soon as
reasonably practicable in detaining Bailey once he drove off the premises
subject to search.”38 The Second Circuit explained that the holding in
Summers contained both a physical and temporal limit: an officer can detain
an occupant if the officer “identif[ies] [the] individual in the process of
leaving the premises subject to search and detain[s] him as soon as
practicable during the execution of the search.”39
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine
whether Michigan v. Summers justifies the detention of an occupant beyond
the immediate vicinity of the premises subject to a search warrant.40

32. Id. at 380.
33. Id. at 379–80.
34. See United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031
(2013) (“Bailey was convicted, following a jury trial, of possession with intent to distribute at
least five grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii),
possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i).”). Bailey moved to vacate his conviction under an ineffective assistance of
counsel theory, but the district court denied this motion. United States v. Bailey, No. 06-CR-232,
2010 WL 277069, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2010).
35. Bailey, 652 F.3d at 199. Bailey also appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his
conviction. Id.
36. Id. at 205.
37. Id. at 205–06.
38. Id. at 207.
39. Id. at 206.
40. Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013).

2014]

BAILEY v. UNITED STATES

639

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons [and] houses . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause . . . .”41 Part II.A of this Note discusses the reasonableness
inquiry that is central to the Court’s analysis of searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment. Part II.B explains how the Court has analyzed the
reasonableness of searches incident to valid arrests. Part II.C examines the
Court’s reasonableness inquiry in the context of detentions incident to the
execution of a lawful search warrant. While many federal courts of appeals
approached the detention cases with a focus on reasonableness, several of
these courts also incorporated other justifications that produced confusion;
this confusion ultimately prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in
Bailey v. United States and to address whether police can detain occupants
off the premises subject to a search warrant.42
A. The Reasonableness Inquiry
Until the Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio in 1968, it analyzed the
reasonableness of a seizure only in cases involving an arrest; moreover, the
Court applied a probable cause standard to determine reasonableness.43 In
Terry, however, the Court altered both of these positions. An arrest was not
the only type of invasion that triggered the analysis of the reasonableness of
a seizure;44 moreover, in cases involving seizures less invasive than arrests,
the Court substituted the probable cause standard to determine
reasonableness for a balancing inquiry.45
The Terry Court recognized that certain types of intrusions do not fall
under the “concept of ‘arrest,’” and thus were not subject to the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause requirement.46 The action in Terry involved
a stop-and-frisk of an individual by a police officer.47 While a stop-andfrisk did not rise to the level of intrusiveness of an arrest, the Court
explained that the officer’s actions “must be tested by the Fourth
41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Warrant Clause also states that the warrant must
“particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id.
42. See infra Part II.C.3.
43. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1979) (discussing the Court’s preTerry Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
44. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
45. Id. at 19.
46. See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 (“An arrest is a wholly different
kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons . . . .”).
47. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6–7.
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Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”48 The officer’s action constituted “a serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the [individual].”49
The Court, however, refused to apply the probable cause standard to a
stop-and-frisk because a stop-and-frisk was “a wholly different kind of
intrusion upon individual freedom.”50 Instead, the Court assessed “the
reasonableness [under] all [of] the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”51 Reasonableness,
the Court noted, was the “central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.”52
The Terry Court balanced the law enforcement interests in officer safety
and preventing crime against the petitioner’s interest in personal security.53
In other cases where the Court has engaged in this balancing inquiry, the
Court addressed other law enforcement concerns, such as destruction of
evidence,54 and individual interests in property, privacy, and safety.55 The
Court has engaged in this inquiry in cases involving, among others,
searches incident to arrests56 and detentions incident to the execution of a
search warrant.57
B. The Reasonableness Inquiry in Cases Involving Searches Incident
to Arrests
An overview of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in cases involving
searches incident to arrests provides a useful context when considering the
Court’s analysis in Bailey v. United States. In Chimel v. California,58 the
Court recognized that an officer’s interests in safety and in preserving

48. Id. at 20.
49. Id. at 17.
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id. at 19.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 22–27; see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979) (“[T]he Court [in
Terry] balanced the limited violation of individual privacy involved against the opposing interests
in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer’s safety.”).
54. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for
the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction.”).
55. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (“[W]hether a
particular search meets the reasonableness standard ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.’” The Court in Acton balanced the individual interest in privacy against the
government’s interest in “[d]eterring drug use.” Id. at 658–61.
56. See infra Part II.B.
57. See infra Part II.C.
58. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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evidence only justified a warrantless search of an arrestee incident to a valid
arrest as well as of the area in the arrestee’s home within the arrestee’s
immediate control.59 Relying on its reasoning in Chimel and the need for a
workable rule, the Court in New York v. Belton60 held that officers could
similarly conduct a warrantless search of the area in a vehicle within the
arrestee’s immediate control after validly arresting the vehicle’s occupant.61
While the Court in Thornton v. United States62 accepted, as it did in Belton,
that officers needed a workable rule, and that the interests in safety and in
preserving evidence supported a warrantless search even though the arrestee
was no longer in his own car, the Court did not critique the relevance of the
officer’s interests as rigorously as Justice Scalia did in his concurrence.63 In
Arizona v. Gant,64 however, the Court tightened its reasonableness inquiry
and found that the circumstances surrounding the officer’s search did not in
fact trigger the justifications underlying the rule in Chimel.65
1. Chimel v. California
In Chimel v. California, three police officers obtained an arrest warrant
for Chimel’s arrest for burglarizing a coin shop.66 The officers served
Chimel with the arrest warrant at his home, asked for his permission to
“look around,” then, over his objection, searched his home for evidence of
the crime.67 They searched the entire house and ultimately obtained many
items, including coins and metals.68 Both state appellate courts rejected
Chimel’s claim to suppress the evidence and found that police had searched
Chimel’s house incident to a valid arrest.69
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California Supreme
Court.70 While the Court recognized the officers’ interests in safety and
obtaining and preserving evidence of Chimel’s crime, the Court found these
interests justified only a search of Chimel’s person and the area “within his
immediate control.”71 The Court defined this term as “the area from within
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See infra Part II.B.1.
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
See infra Part II.B.2.
541 U.S. 615 (2004).
See infra Part II.B.3.
556 U.S. 332 (2009).
See infra Part II.B.4.
395 U.S. 752, 753 (1969).
Id. at 753–54.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 754–55.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 763.
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which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.”72 The Court ultimately rejected the argument that the search of
Chimel’s entire home was reasonable.73 This argument, the Court
explained, could “evaporat[e]” Fourth Amendment protections of the
individual and allow officers to defend a search based on “subjective
view[s] regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct”
without clear limits.74 Thus, the Court held that the search was
unreasonable.75
2. New York v. Belton
In New York v. Belton, a police officer pulled over a speeding vehicle
and suspected that the occupants possessed marijuana.76 The officer then
ordered the four occupants “out of the car, and placed them under arrest for
the unlawful possession of mari[j]uana.”77 After he searched the arrestees,
the officer searched the car’s passenger compartment and found a jacket
that contained cocaine in one of the pockets.78 Belton, the arrestee to whom
the jacket belonged, was later charged with criminal possession of a
controlled substance.79 The trial court denied Belton’s motion to suppress
the evidence, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed and held that the
warrantless search of the jacket could not be upheld as a “search incident to
a lawful arrest” where there was no risk that any of the arrestees could gain
access to the jacket.80
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals.81 The Court acknowledged that, without a “straightforward rule,”
individuals cannot know the extent of their protection under the law nor can
officers grasp the extent of their authority.82 Though the search incident to
arrest in Chimel took place in a home, the Belton Court looked to Chimel
because there was no “workable definition” of Chimel’s central term—

72. Id.
73. Id. at 764–65.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 768.
76. See 453 U.S. 454, 455–56 (1981) (“[T]he policeman had smelled burnt marihuana and
had seen on the floor of the car an envelope marked ‘Supergold’ that he associated with
marihuana.”).
77. Id. at 456.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 462–63.
82. Id. at 459–60.
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“within the [arrestee’s] immediate control”—for searches of a vehicle.83
The Belton Court recognized that the Chimel Court had taken into account
law enforcement interests in officer safety and evidence preservation when
making its determination that the warrantless search of the area “within [an
arrestee’s] immediate control” was reasonable.84 The Belton Court
ultimately found that the search of Belton’s car invoked the same law
enforcement interests as the search in Chimel, and that a passenger
compartment constituted an area within the arrestee’s immediate control.85
Accordingly, the Court held that the officer’s search of Belton’s jacket,
located in the passenger compartment of the car, amounted to a reasonable
search incident to a lawful arrest and thus did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.86
3. Thornton v. United States
In Thornton v. United States, Thornton aroused an officer’s suspicions
when he tried to avoid driving next to the officer’s unmarked police car.87
Upon running a check on Thornton’s license plate number, the officer
learned the number was issued to a different car from the one Thornton was
driving.88 Thornton had already turned into a parking lot, parked, and left
his car by the time the officer caught up to him. 89 When the officer
approached Thornton and questioned him about his car, he “[a]ppeared
nervous. . . . [and] began rambling and licking his lips . . . [and] was
sweating.”90 Thornton agreed to the officer’s request to pat him down, at
which point the officer found drugs on him. 91 After the officer handcuffed
Thornton, informed him he was under arrest, and placed him in the police
car, he searched Thornton’s car and found a handgun.92 The trial and
appellate courts rejected Thornton’s attempt to suppress the handgun and
83. Id. at 460.
84. See id. at 457 (“Such searches have long been considered valid because of the need ‘to
remove any weapons that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape’ and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.” (quoting Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969))).
85. See id. at 460 (“Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside
the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact
generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to
grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].’” (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969))).
86. Id. at 462–63.
87. 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
88. Id. at 618.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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distinguish Belton by arguing that he was not in his vehicle when the officer
approached him.93
The Supreme Court affirmed.94 The Court found that the Belton Court
accorded no weight to the fact that the officer had met the occupants while
they were inside the vehicle.95 The Court noted that an officer possesses
“identical concerns” about safety and the preservation of evidence whether
the suspect is inside, or next to, the vehicle.96 As in Belton, the Thornton
Court affirmed the need to lay down a “clear rule” for officers to apply.97
Thornton’s proposed rule, however, would place officers in the
“impracticable” position of making “highly fact specific . . . ad hoc
determinations” each time they approached an occupant.98 Thus, the Court
held that the search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of its occupant is
reasonable under Belton—“even when an officer does not make contact
until the person arrested has left the vehicle”99—so long as the arrestee is a
“recent occupant” of the vehicle.100
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia reasoned that the
justifications underpinning Chimel—safety and evidentiary concerns—
could not support the search of Thornton’s vehicle for three reasons: (1)
Thornton, handcuffed and secured in the officer’s car, could not escape to
destroy evidence or secure a firearm;101 (2) the officer did not have a
government right to secure Thornton, even if it was sensible to do so;102 and
(3) the key premise in Belton was not true anymore (if it ever was), namely,
that the passenger compartment was within the area of immediate control of
the arrestee.103 Justice Scalia would have limited Belton searches to
situations where the officer reasonably believed that “evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”104 Because the officer
could have reasonably believed that Thornton—arrested for a drug

93. Id. at 618–19.
94. Id. at 624.
95. Id. at 619–20.
96. Id. at 621.
97. Id. at 623.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 617.
100. Id. at 623–24.
101. See id. at 625–27 (“The risk that a suspect handcuffed in the back of a squad car might
escape and recover a weapon from his vehicle is surely no greater than the risk that a suspect
handcuffed in his residence might escape and recover a weapon from the next room—a danger we
held insufficient to justify a search in Chimel . . . .”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 627–28.
104. Id. at 632.
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offense—had evidence of that crime in his car, Justice Scalia concluded that
the officer’s search was reasonable.105
4. Arizona v. Gant
In Arizona v. Gant, officers received an anonymous tip that drugs were
being sold at a particular house.106 Upon the officers’ arrival at the house,
Gant answered the door and told the officers the owner was not present.107
The officers left and then ran a records check on Gant, upon which they
learned of his outstanding arrest warrant for “driving with a suspended
license.”108 Shortly after the officers returned to the house that evening,
they recognized Gant as he pulled up to the driveway, then summoned him
from his car and immediately arrested him.109 After the officers secured
Gant in a police car, they searched his car and found cocaine and a gun.110
Gant was ultimately charged with two drug offenses.111 The trial court
dismissed Gant’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search
of his car,112 but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held that the
search was unreasonable.113 The Arizona Supreme Court explained that the
“‘justifications underlying Chimel’”—officer safety and evidence
preservation—disappeared once the officers secured the scene, handcuffed
Gant, and locked him in a police car.114
The Supreme Court affirmed.115 The Court reasoned that courts of
appeals had read Belton so broadly that officers could search a vehicle
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even when, “in most cases,” the
arrestee could not reach the passenger compartment.116 To avoid adopting
an interpretation of Belton that would “untether the rule from the
justifications underlying the Chimel exception,” the Gant Court explained
that officers could search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent

105. Id.
106. 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009).
107. Id. at 335–36.
108. Id. at 336.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. (“Among other things, Gant argued that Belton did not authorize the search of his
vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and
because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his
vehicle.”).
113. Id. at 337.
114. Id. at 337–38.
115. Id. at 351.
116. Id. at 342–43.
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occupant only “when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”117 Adopting the
argument Justice Scalia set forth in his concurrence in Thornton, the Gant
Court explained that an officer could also search a vehicle if the officer
reasonably believed that the search would produce evidence “‘relevant to
the crime of arrest.’”118 The Court ultimately held that the search of Gant’s
car was unreasonable because the officers lacked a reasonable belief that
Gant could access his car “at the time of the search” or that they could find
therein “evidence of the offense for which he was arrested”—driving with a
suspended license.119
Concurring, Justice Scalia argued that only one justification could
make reasonable a search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of its occupant:
if the officer is searching for “evidence of the crime for which the arrest
was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe
occurred.”120 Justice Scalia reasoned that limiting the justifications for
automobile searches incident to arrests in this manner would “tether[] the
scope and rationale of the doctrine to the triggering event.”121
While the Court in Chimel, Belton, and Thornton articulated a sphere
of power for officers to conduct a warrantless search incident to a valid
arrest, the Court most recently demonstrated in Gant that it is determined to
scrutinize whether the circumstances surrounding the officer’s actions
actually trigger law enforcement interests such as safety and evidence
preservation.122 When these law enforcement interests are not at stake, as in
Gant, the Court has demonstrated that it will circumscribe police power as
is necessary to respect the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment—
reasonableness.123
C. The Reasonableness Inquiry in Cases Involving Detentions Incident
to the Execution of a Search Warrant
1. Michigan v. Summers
In Michigan v. Summers, police were about to execute a search warrant
at a residence when they “encountered [Summers] descending the front

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 343.
Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
Id. at 344.
Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 116–119.
See supra text accompanying notes 116–119.

2014]

BAILEY v. UNITED STATES

647

steps.”124 The officers detained Summers for the duration of the search.125
Once the officers discovered drugs in the basement and identified Summers
as the owner of the home, they arrested him.126 A search of his person
revealed heroin in his coat pocket.127 Summers was “charged with
possession of the heroin found on his person,” but the trial court granted his
motion to suppress the evidence as “the product of an illegal search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”128 The state appellate courts affirmed
the trial court’s ruling, but the Supreme Court reversed.129
The Court found the detention, arrest, and search of Summers
reasonable.130 First, the Court explained that certain cases, like Terry,
demonstrate that some seizures “constitute such limited intrusions . . . and
are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be
made on less than probable cause.”131 Second, the Court articulated three
law enforcement interests that justified Summers’s detention: (1) preventing
flight, (2) protecting the officers, and (3) completing the search.132 The
Court stressed that a valid search warrant, signed by a neutral magistrate,
constitutes “an objective justification” for an officer to believe occupants of
the premises to be searched are engaged in criminal activity.133 Relying on
these factors, the Court held that police officers have “limited authority to
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted” if
they have “a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable
cause.”134 The Court noted that its decision would not burden officers with
evaluating on a case-by-case basis whether the detention of an occupant
incident to a lawful search of a premises was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.135

124. 452 U.S. 692, 693 (1981).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 694.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 705.
131. Id. at 699.
132. Id. at 702–03.
133. See id. at 703–04 (“The connection of an occupant to that home [where a neutral
magistrate has determined there is probable cause to believe a crime is taking place] gives the
police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal
activity justifies a detention of that occupant.”).
134. Id. at 705.
135. See id. at 705 n.19 (“The rule we adopt today does not depend upon . . . ad hoc
determination[s], because the officer is not required to evaluate either the quantum of proof
justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.”).
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2. Muehler v. Mena
In Muehler v. Mena,136 a Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”)
team and police officers executed a search warrant for “deadly weapons and
other evidence of gang membership” at a house thought to be associated
with a violent gang.137 Upon entering the house, the officers handcuffed at
gunpoint Mena and three other individuals, then detained them in the
garage for the duration of the search.138 The officers released the detainees
several hours later.139 Mena sued the officers under the theory that “she
was detained for an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”140 A jury found the officers’ actions
unreasonable, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.141
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the lower courts and
remanded.142 According to the Court, “Mena’s detention was, under
Summers, plainly permissible” because “[a]n officer’s authority to detain
incident to a search is categorical . . . .”143 The Court reasoned that two
elements made the detention reasonable for the duration of the search: the
existence of a search warrant, and the identification of Mena as an occupant
of the premises subject to the search warrant at the time it was executed. 144
The Muehler Court explained that Summers authorizes officers to use
“reasonable force” in detaining an occupant during a search.145 The
officers’ use of handcuffs, however, was “undoubtedly a separate intrusion
in addition to” Mena’s detention in the garage.146 The Court then balanced
the extent of the intrusions against the interests of the officers at the
scene.147 Although the Court recognized that Mena’s detention was “more
intrusive” than the detention in Summers, the Court reasoned that “the
governmental interests outweigh[ed] the marginal intrusion.”148
In
particular, the Court stressed that the search for weapons and a “wanted
gang member” constituted an “inherently dangerous situation[]” that
triggered the law enforcement interest in “minimizing the risk of harm to
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

544 U.S. 93 (2005).
Id. at 95–96.
Id. at 96.
See id. at 100 (noting the detainees’ “2– to 3–hour detention”).
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 99–100.
Id. at 99.
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both officers and occupants.”149 While the Muehler Court expanded the
scope of a Summers detention, the Court endeavored to balance competing
safety interests of the officers and the occupants in light of the intrusive
nature of the detention.150
3. Federal Courts of Appeals Consider Summers in Cases
Involving Off-Premises Detentions151
a.

Interpretations of Summers Before Muehler by Federal
Courts of Appeals

Before Muehler was decided in 2005, several federal courts of appeals
applied Summers differently when confronted with an off-premises
detention of an occupant during the execution of a valid search warrant. In
United States v. Cochran,152 for example, the Sixth Circuit held that
Summers imposed no geographic limit on police authority to detain an
occupant during a valid search of a premises.153 As officers prepared to
execute a search warrant, they observed Cochran exit the premises by car.154
They decided to detain him to facilitate the search but did not do so until he
had “travelled a short distance” from the premises.155 In upholding
Cochran’s eventual conviction, the Sixth Circuit explained that “Summers
does not impose upon police a duty based on geographic proximity . . .
rather, the focus is upon police performance, that is, whether the police
detained defendant as soon as practicable after departing from his
residence.”156
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit upheld an off-premises detention in United
States v. Cavazos.157 Officers were surveying a premises before executing a
search warrant when they observed Cavazos leave the premises in his

149. Id. at 100.
150. Id. at 98–100.
151. This Section considers federal cases since the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bailey
to resolve the conflicting interpretations of Summers among the federal courts of appeals. Several
state courts have also split in their interpretations of Summers. Compare Whitaker v.
Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 539 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to recognize a spatial limit in
Summers), and Fromm v. State, 624 A.2d 1296, 96 Md. App. 249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)
(same), with Commonwealth v. Charros, 824 N.E.2d 809 (Mass. 2005) (recognizing an offpremises detention as unduly intrusive), and Commonwealth v. Graziano-Constantino, 718 A.2d
746 (Pa. 1998) (same).
152. 939 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1991).
153. Id. at 339.
154. Id. at 338.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 339.
157. 288 F.3d 706, 711–12 (5th Cir. 2002).
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truck.158 The truck pulled up next to the officers’ vehicle and “its occupants
peered at the officers inside.”159 When the officers pursued Cavazos, he
turned his truck around and confronted them, as if the vehicles were in a
“stand off.”160 The officers then exited their vehicle and detained Cavazos
in the street, about two blocks away from the premises.161 Like the Sixth
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit explained that Summers did not hinge on a spatial
relationship between the location of the detention and the premises subject
to the search warrant.162 The Fifth Circuit, however, analyzed the
circumstances of Cavazos’s detention more rigorously by drawing the
interest-balancing approach from the Summers Court and weighing “‘the
character of the official intrusion and its justification.’”163 The court
reasoned that Cavazos’s actions, particularly his surveillance of the officers
and his aggressive driving, had triggered all three of the Summers
governmental interests: the elimination of flight, the completion of the
search, and the protection of the officers.164
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Sherrill165 that
an off-premises detention was too intrusive for the court to uphold under
Summers.166 While officers prepared to execute a search warrant at
Sherrill’s residence, they observed Sherrill leave the premises in his
vehicle.167 The officers pulled Sherrill’s car over “one block away from his
home,” detained him, and returned him to the premises, where he assisted
the officers in completing the search.168 The Eighth Circuit explained that
Summers did not justify Sherrill’s detention for two reasons.169 First, the
court reasoned that the off-premises detention was much more intrusive
than in Summers “because Sherrill had already exited the premises.”170 In
support of its contention, the Eighth Circuit cited a similar case in which the
court had declined to extend Summers to the detention of an occupant “three
158. Id. at 708.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 708, 711.
162. See id. at 712 (“The proximity between an occupant of a residence and the residence
itself may be relevant in deciding whether to apply Summers, but it is by no means controlling.”).
163. Id. at 711 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981)).
164. See id. (“[His] conduct warranted the belief that Cavazos would have fled or alerted the
other occupants of the residence about the agents nearby if he were released immediately after the
stop and frisk.”).
165. 27 F.3d 344 (8th Cir. 1994).
166. Id. at 346.
167. Id. at 345.
168. Id. at 345–46.
169. Id. at 346.
170. Id.
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to five miles away” from the premises subject to a search warrant.171
Second, the court reasoned that the circumstances of the detention did not
satisfy two of the Summers interests: completing the search or preventing
flight.172 Thus, the court found that the intrusiveness of the detention
greatly outweighed the law enforcement interests.173
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit declined to extend Summers in United
States v. Edwards.174 In Edwards, officers prepared to execute a search
warrant at a “suspected ‘drug house.’”175 The officers watched Edwards, a
“frequent visitor,” drive away from the premises before they executed the
search.176 The officers then pulled Edwards over and detained him “at
streetside for forty five minutes” until other officers completed the search of
the premises.177 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged a seeming “parallel” with
Summers, in that “if an ‘occupant’ on the premises may be so detained, it
might appear that Edwards—who had just left the premises—could be
similarly detained.”178 The court ultimately rejected this parallel, however,
by reasoning that Edwards’s detention failed to fulfill two of the Summers
law enforcement interests—preserving the evidence and protecting the
officers—“in any way,” and that the third interest—preventing the
occupant’s flight—“was far more attenuated than in Summers.”179 While
these federal courts of appeals generally adopted the Summers Court’s
reasonableness inquiry of analyzing “the character of the official intrusion

171. Id. (citing United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1994)). In Hogan, the
Eighth Circuit found that:
Summers [was] not applicable . . . [because] the police officers encountered the
defendant descending the front steps as they were about to execute a warrant to search
his house for narcotics. . . . Here, Hogan was not on his front steps or even near his
home. He was stopped three to five miles away, handcuffed, and taken back to his
house.
Hogan, 25 F.3d at 693.
172. See Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346 (“[T]he officers had no interest in preventing flight or
minimizing the search’s risk [by detaining Sherrill] because Sherrill had left the area of the search
and was unaware of the warrant.”). Sherrill did, however, “help the officers conduct the search.”
Id.
173. Id.
174. 103 F.3d 90, 93–94 (10th Cir. 1996).
175. Id. at 91.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 91–92.
178. Id. at 93.
179. Id. at 93–94.
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and its justification,” they nevertheless varied in their application of
Summers to off-premises detentions.180
b. Interpretations of Summers After Muehler by Federal Courts
of Appeals
After Muehler was decided in 2005, federal courts of appeals
consistently justified off-premises detentions but did so by alternately
focusing on the officers’ actions and balancing the three law enforcement
interests raised in Summers. In United States v. Castro-Portillo,181 for
example, the Tenth Circuit recognized the significance of Muehler in
expanding the authority underlying Summers.182 Officers detained and
handcuffed Castro-Portillo two blocks from the house he exited before they
executed a search warrant there and found drugs.183 In concluding that
Castro-Portillo’s detention was permissible pursuant to the execution of the
search warrant, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Muehler Court
“extended” the Summers rule and provided officers with “‘categorical’”
power to detain Castro-Portillo.184 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit found that
the officers acted “as soon as reasonably practicable” in detaining CastroPortillo.185 Even though the Tenth Circuit previously declined to extend
Summers to the off-premises detention in Edwards, it explained in CastroPortillo that Edwards “preceded” Muehler and that Castro-Portillo’s
detention was distinguishable.186
In United States v. Montieth,187 the Fourth Circuit similarly recognized
Muehler as strengthening police authority to detain incident to the

180. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981). But see United States v. Cochran, 939
F.2d 337, 338–40 (6th Cir. 1991) (failing to refer to any of the three governmental interests in
Summers in reaching its decision).
181. 211 F.App’x 715 (10th Cir. 2007).
182. Id. at 720–24.
183. Id. at 717.
184. Id. at 720. The Tenth Circuit explained:
The fact [Castro-Portillo] was not observed committing a crime at the time of the stop,
drove away from the house moments before the execution of the search warrant, and
did not know about the search warrant did not prevent authorities from having the
requisite suspicion to stop him. . . . The search warrant alone provided reasonable
suspicion to stop Mr. Castro-Portillo, and the fact he did not know about the search
warrant does not diminish the risk he may have posed.
Id. at 721.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 721–22 (noting, for example, that, whereas Edwards was held at gunpoint and
for thirty minutes longer than necessary, Castro-Portillo was not held at gunpoint and for a period
as short as possible).
187. 662 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 2011).
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execution of a search warrant.188 Officers detained Montieth nearly eighttenths of a mile from his home, which was subject to a search warrant, and
acquired his consent to execute the search.189 Drawing upon Muehler, the
Fourth Circuit explained that the officers’ authority to detain Montieth was
“categorical” and did not depend on any “‘quantum of proof justifying
detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.’”190
The Fourth Circuit found the officers’ actions were justified because the
detention served the Summers law enforcement interests in officer safety
and the completion of the search.191 The court concluded that the officers
assumed “the most practicable means” of executing the search by not
forcibly entering Montieth’s home where his wife and children resided and
instead obtaining Montieth’s consent before undertaking the search.192
Both the Fourth and Tenth Circuits interpreted Muehler as
strengthening police power to detain an occupant incident to a search under
Summers.193 Moreover, they analyzed the detention using the term first
pronounced by the Sixth Circuit in Cochran: “whether the police detained
defendant as soon as practicable after departing from his residence.”194 The
Seventh Circuit and the Second Circuit also adopted this language from
Cochran in upholding off-premises detentions in United States v. Bullock195
and United States v. Bailey,196 respectively. The Seventh, Second, and
Fourth Circuits turned to the traditional reasonableness inquiry and
examined the circumstances of the detention in light of the three law

188. Id. at 666.
189. Id. at 663.
190. Id. at 666.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 667. The Fourth Circuit stressed that its holding “should not be over-read” and it
“do[es] not suggest that any detention away from the home to be searched is invariably a
reasonable one.” Id. The court noted that “in some circumstances the distance from the home
may combine with other factors surrounding the search to present an objectively unreasonable
plan of warrant execution.” Id. But here, according to the court, this was not the case. Id.
193. See supra notes 184, 190 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 185, 192 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Cochran, 939
F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1991).
195. See 632 F.3d 1004, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is nothing to suggest that the vehicle
was not pulled over as soon as practicable.” (emphasis added)).
196. See 652 F.3d 197, 206 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013) (“[P]olice must
identify an individual in the process of leaving the premises subject to search and detain him as
soon as practicable during the execution of the search.”); see also United States v. Sears, 139
F.App’x 162, 166 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“That the stop does not occur on the premises to
be searched is irrelevant so long as the officers detain the individual as soon as practicable after
his departure.” (emphasis added)). While the Sears Court decided this case nearly three months
after the Supreme Court decided Muehler, it is unclear if it took the Muehler decision into
account. The Sears Court did not mention Muehler.
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enforcement interests articulated in Summers.197 Thus, while federal courts
of appeals consistently upheld off-premises detentions after Muehler, these
courts relied on several justifications to underpin their conclusions. Due to
the inconsistent use of justifications regarding reasonableness in these types
of cases, the Supreme Court considered the Second Circuit’s opinion in
United States v. Bailey alongside these various cases.198
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Bailey v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the Second Circuit and held that the detention of an occupant nearly one
mile from the premises subject to a valid search warrant was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.199 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
explained that the rule in Michigan v. Summers could not apply to
detentions beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises because such a
detention did not further the three law enforcement interests articulated in
Summers; rather, the detention would pose too severe an intrusion upon the
individual.200 Tracing the Court’s exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
requirement “prohibiting detention absent probable cause,”201 the majority
reasoned that any exception had to adhere closely to the Fourth
Amendment’s “purpose and rationale.”202 Thus, in determining whether to
uphold Bailey’s detention as an extension of Summers, the Court
acknowledged it would have to consider whether Bailey’s detention aligned
with the reasoning underlying Summers.203
As the Court set out to analyze the three law enforcement interests
underpinning the Summers rule—officer safety, effective completion of the
search, and preventing flight—the Court expressed concern over the extent
of police authority to detain incident to a search as a result of Muehler v.
Mena.204 Recognizing that Muehler provided police with broad power to
detain “at the scene of the search,” the Bailey Court reasoned that police

197. See Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1019 (“[T]he officers’ interests in detaining [Bullock] during the
search were not outweighed by this rather limited intrusion on his freedom.”); supra text
accompanying notes 36, 191.
198. See Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013) (explaining that the “Federal
Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions as to whether Michigan v. Summers justifies
the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises covered by a search
warrant”).
199. Id. at 1042–43.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1038.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1038–39.
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would have too much authority if officers were permitted to detain
occupants away from the scene of the search as well.205
In analyzing the facts of Bailey’s detention, the Court reasoned that
none of the law enforcement interests articulated in Summers applied “with
the same or similar force.”206 For the first interest—officer safety—the
Court explained that officers did not minimize a risk of harm to themselves
by detaining Bailey because he had already left the premises before the
execution of the search.207 The Court also rejected the Second Circuit’s
concern that if officers were deprived of the authority to detain offpremises, they would have to make a difficult choice between detaining an
occupant on the premises, which might alert occupants inside of the
residence of the impending search, or letting the individual get away.208
According to the Court, such a concern rested on the “false premise” that
officers were required to detain Bailey in the first place.209 Instead, the
Court suggested that officers could elect not to detain immediately but
pursue the suspect and, if appropriate, stop him later under Terry.210 For the
next law enforcement interest—effective completion of the search—the
Court explained that Bailey could not frustrate the officers’ attempt to
complete the search because he was not at the scene when they executed the
warrant.211 The Court redefined the last interest—preventing flight—as a
branch of the second interest, which the Court already determined was not
advanced by Bailey’s detention.212
In analyzing the intrusion on Bailey, the Court considered Bailey’s
detention more like “a full-fledged arrest” than the minor invasion in
Summers because he was publicly handcuffed and transported back to his
residence in a police car.213 According to the Court, “[t]hese facts illustrate
that detention away from a premises where police are already present often
will be more intrusive than detentions at the scene.”214 After balancing the

205. Id. at 1039.
206. Id. at 1038–41.
207. See id. at 1039 (“Bailey had left the premises, apparently without knowledge of the
search. He posed little risk to the officers at the scene.”).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id. (“[W]here there are grounds to believe the departing occupant is dangerous, or
involved in criminal activity, police will generally not need Summers to detain him at least for
brief questioning, as they can rely instead on Terry.”).
211. See id. at 1040 (“[A]fter Bailey drove away from the Lake Drive apartment, he was not a
threat to the proper execution of the search.”).
212. Id. at 1041.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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law enforcement interests at stake against the interest to Bailey, the Court
found Bailey’s detention unreasonable.215
The Court did not go so far as to conclude its analysis by declaring that
any detention away from the premises to be searched is incompatible with
Summers.216 Rather, it confined an officer’s power to detain occupants
under Summers to “the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
searched.”217 According to the Court, drawing this line ensured that a
detention under Summers would not depart from its “underlying
justification,” that is, “the safe and efficient execution of a search
warrant.”218 The Court, however, declined to define its geographic
demarcation—the immediate vicinity of the premises—because the Court
concluded that Bailey clearly was not detained in that area.219 Instead, the
Court identified several factors lower courts could use to evaluate whether
the officers in a particular situation had conformed to this new spatial line,
such as “the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant was within
the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the occupant’s
location, and other relevant factors.”220 The Court did not address the
application of Terry to the detention but left this question for the Second
Circuit to consider on remand.221
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority’s decision but wrote a
concurring opinion to critique the Second Circuit’s “interest-balancing
approach.”222 According to Justice Scalia, when a court considers whether
Summers applies, it need not engage in “any balancing . . . because the
Summers exception, within its scope, is ‘categorical.’”223 Justice Scalia
explained that the proper inquiry was binary: did the officers detain an
occupant, someone “within ‘the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
searched,’” or not?224 According to Justice Scalia, Bailey—“seized a mile
away”—was not an occupant; thus, Summers did not apply.225 Furthermore,
215. Id. at 1042.
216. Id. at 1041–43.
217. Id. at 1042.
218. Id.
219. See id. (“[P]etitioner was detained at a point beyond any reasonable understanding of the
immediate vicinity of the premises in question; and so this case presents neither the necessity nor
the occasion to further define the meaning of immediate vicinity.”).
220. Id.
221. See id. at 1043 (“[T]he District Court, as an alternative ruling, held that stopping
petitioner was lawful under Terry. This opinion expresses no view on that issue. It will be open,
on remand, for the Court of Appeals to address the matter . . . .”).
222. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
223. Id. (quoting Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005)).
224. Id. (citing Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1041 (majority opinion)).
225. Id.
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Justice Scalia criticized the Second Circuit’s finding that Summers
permitted detentions if accomplished “‘as soon as practicable.’”226 Justice
Scalia asserted that “a Summers seizure . . . ‘is not the Government’s right;
it is an exception—justified by necessity—to a rule that would otherwise
render the [seizure] unlawful.’”227 Justice Scalia concluded by critiquing
the Summers Court for identifying overly broad law enforcement interests
in its decision.228 According to Justice Scalia, the only justification for the
detention in Summers was “law enforcement’s interest in carrying out the
search unimpeded by violence or other disruptions.”229
Justice Breyer stated in dissent that the Second Circuit did not err
because Bailey’s detention satisfied each of the law enforcement interests in
Summers.230 Moreover, Justice Breyer asserted that drawing the line at “as
soon as reasonably practicable” was more appropriate than drawing the line
at “immediate vicinity” because the latter was too ambiguous for courts to
apply.231 Consequently, Justice Breyer said, the majority’s rule did not
“offer[] [an] easily administered bright line”; rather, it “invite[d] case-bycase litigation” yet “offer[ed] no clear case-by-case guidance.”232 Justice
Breyer also reasoned that when the majority crafted its rule, it should have
taken into greater consideration the three law enforcement interests in
Summers, which he regarded as pillars of reasonableness.233 Justice Breyer
concluded that adopting the Second Circuit’s “as soon as reasonably
practicable” standard would have more accurately addressed Fourth
Amendment concerns.234
IV. ANALYSIS
In Bailey v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a detention
made beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises subject to a search
warrant was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.235 The Court
drew a spatial line to ensure that police power to detain comported with the
226. Id. at 1044 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 206 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133
S. Ct. 1031 (2013)).
227. Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
228. See id. (“Regrettably, this Court’s opinion in Summers facilitated the Court of Appeals’
error here by setting forth a smorgasbord of law-enforcement interests assertedly justifying its
holding. . . . We should not have been so expansive.”).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1045 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 1047.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1048.
234. Id. at 1046, 1049.
235. Id. at 1042–43 (majority opinion).

658

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:635

underlying law enforcement interest in “the safe and efficient execution” of
the search.236 This law enforcement interest was an appropriate, succinct
modification of the three law enforcement interests articulated in
Summers—protecting the officers, completing the search, and preventing
flight.237 The Court also communicated its holding clearly to lower
courts.238 Whereas the Summers Court did not clarify the scope of the term
“occupant” for lower courts,239 the Bailey Court provided factors to
incorporate in assessing the term “immediate vicinity,” as well as the
flexibility to analyze this term on a case-by-case basis.240 Moreover, in his
concurrence, Justice Scalia clarified the application and scope of Summers
by addressing the various justifications underlining the Second Circuit’s
decision.241 Like the Gant Court in the search-incident-to-arrest context,
the Bailey Court stressed that exceptions to Fourth Amendment rules have a
narrow scope and performed a rigorous analysis of the purported
justifications of the officer’s actions.242 Through its holding, the Bailey
Court struck a proper balance to ensure law enforcement interests do not
unreasonably intrude upon individual liberty interests.
A. The Bailey Court Succinctly Modified the Three Law Enforcement
Interests Articulated in Summers to Ensure That Police Power to
Detain Occupants Within the Immediate Vicinity of the Premises to
be Searched Is Reasonable
The Bailey Court explained that its spatial line—immediate vicinity of
the premises to be searched—would cover “the area in which an occupant
poses a real threat to the safe and efficient execution of a search warrant.”243
The Court indicated that the “underlying justification” for its spatial line
was not as broad as the series of law enforcement interests in Summers.244
Admittedly, the interests do overlap. For example, the Bailey Court
recognized the Summers interests in minimizing the risk of harm to officers

236. Id. at 1042.
237. See infra Part IV.A.
238. See infra Part IV.B.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct.
1031 (2013) (“This question has divided the Courts of Appeals. Of the five courts to consider it,
three have extended Summers on facts similar to those of this case. . . . Two circuits have declined
to extend Summers to permit detention of occupants who have been seen leaving a residence
subject to a search warrant.”).
240. See infra Part IV.B.
241. See infra Part IV.C.
242. See infra Part IV.D.
243. Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1042 (2013).
244. Id.
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and in completing the search by emphasizing the interest in “the safe and
efficient execution” of the search.245 The Bailey Court explained, though,
that “[t]he concern over flight is not because of the danger of flight itself”;
rather, the concern over flight is only relevant insofar as it undermines “the
integrity of the search.”246 By modifying the justifications for Summers
detentions, the Bailey Court succeeded in tethering its holding to law
enforcement interests that underpin an officer’s power to detain an occupant
incident to the execution of a search warrant.
While the dissent argued that the concern over flight “will be present
in all Summers detentions,” the dissent did not tether its illustration to the
facts of Bailey’s detention or the overarching concern for the search.247
Justice Breyer explained that “any occupant departing a residence
containing contraband will have incentive to flee once he encounters
police.”248 Bailey, however, did not flee once he encountered the police.249
While other suspects or detainees might act differently if confronted on the
premises, it is unlikely Bailey’s flight could have threatened the search of
his residence. He was a mile away.250
Justice Scalia criticized the Summers Court for justifying its decision
on law enforcement interests that were too “expansive.”251 He construed
the proper justifications for a Summers detention more narrowly than
Justice Kennedy. “The Summers exception,” Justice Scalia explained, “is
appropriately predicated only on law enforcement’s interest in carrying out
the search unimpeded by violence or other disruptions.”252 Like Justice
Kennedy, Justice Scalia would not have permitted the detention of
occupants under the theory that doing so eliminated the risk of flight of the
occupant.253 Justice Scalia, however, implicitly disagreed with Justice
Kennedy that the “efficient execution” of the search constituted a valid

245. Id.
246. Id. at 1041.
247. Id. at 1047 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248. Id.
249. See id. at 1036 (majority opinion) (“[The officers] tailed Bailey’s car for about a mile—
and for about five minutes—before pulling the vehicle over . . . . They ordered Bailey and
Middleton out of the car and did a patdown search of both men.”).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1044 (Scalia, J., concurring); see supra note 228 and accompanying text.
252. Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1044.
253. See id. (explaining that the Summers Court laid out a series of law enforcement interests
that were too “expansive,” including “‘preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is
found.’” (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981))).
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justification for the detention.254 The interest in efficiency appeared to
Justice Scalia to depart from “‘[t]he common denominator,’” which the
Court has used to uphold “seizures based on less than probable cause” as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment: a “governmental interest
independent of the ordinary interest in investigating crime and
apprehending suspects.”255 Whereas Justice Breyer in dissent endorsed the
three law enforcement interests articulated by the Summers Court, Justice
Scalia in concurrence sought to confine the underlying justification for a
detention under Summers to just one interest.
B. The Bailey Court Communicated Clearly How Lower Courts Were
to Interpret “Immediate Vicinity” and Provided Them Flexibility to
Apply This Term on a Case-by-Case Basis
The Bailey Court stated that lower courts could “consider a number of
factors” to determine whether an officer had detained an occupant within
the immediate vicinity of the premises subject to a search warrant.256 Those
factors included, but were not limited to, the following: “the lawful limits of
the premises, whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his
dwelling, [and] the ease of reentry from the occupant’s location . . . .”257
In dissent, Justice Breyer stated that “[t]he majority’s line invites caseby-case litigation.”258 Even if Justice Breyer is correct, however, the Bailey
Court neither needed to nor arguably should have tried to draw a bright
spatial line. First, the Bailey Court did not need to draw a bright line with a
restrictive definition of “immediate vicinity” because the officers had
detained Bailey nearly a mile from the premises, “a point beyond any
reasonable understanding of the immediate vicinity” of his residence.259
The Court granted certiorari to address a particular question and issued a
holding on that particular question.260
254. See id. (labeling the law enforcement interest in “obtaining residents’ assistance in
‘open[ing] locked doors or locked containers’” as too “expansive” (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at
703)).
255. Id. (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). According to Justice
Scalia, “[p]reventing flight is not a special governmental interest—it is indistinguishable from the
ordinary interest in apprehending suspects. Similarly, the interest in inducing residents to open
locked doors or containers is nothing more than the ordinary interest in investigating crime.” Id.
at 1045.
256. Id. at 1042 (majority opinion).
257. Id. The Bailey Court also stated that courts could take into account “other relevant
factors.” Id.
258. Id. at 1047 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 1042 (majority opinion).
260. See id. at 1037 (“The Federal Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions as to
whether Michigan v. Summers justifies the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity
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Second, it is plausible the Bailey Court recognized an indomitable
challenge in defining a term that officers and courts would inevitably
interpret in a variety of ways. “[T]he limitations of language,” Professor
Albert Alschuler noted, “make extremely difficult the articulation of general
principles that will yield justice in almost every situation that they
address.”261 There are many types of houses, apartments, and other
premises an officer might prepare to search; to try to explain fully the
immediate vicinity of each would require a list of factors larger than
anything the Bailey Court could hope to catalog. Moreover, Fourth
Amendment cases often hinge on “particulars” as opposed to “blanket”
statements and rules.262 The Bailey Court was right to communicate to
courts examples of relevant factors the courts could use to analyze the
particular facts of a given case rather than confine the meaning of the term
“immediate vicinity” to an exclusive list. Moreover, if the Bailey Court had
drawn a rigid spatial line, lawyers—“‘trained to attack ‘bright lines’ the
way hounds attack foxes’”263—would likely have feasted on it.
Third, the scope of the Bailey line does not unnecessarily constrain
officers or lower courts. The majority and concurrence both stressed the
importance of confining the scope of the detention to the underlying
justification.264 The Bailey rule, indeed, is an exception and ought not
permit expansive interpretations or outcomes.265 The Court, in fact,
expressed concern regarding outcomes yielding expansive police power in
its discussion of Muehler v. Mena; it recognized Muehler as a sign of the
“far-reaching authority the police have when the detention is made at the
scene of the search.”266 When coupled with Justice Scalia’s critique of the
Summers Court’s reasoning—“[w]e should not have been so
expansive”267—the majority’s analysis of Muehler indicates that the Bailey

of the premises covered by a search warrant. This Court granted certiorari to address the
question.”).
261. Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV.
227, 227 (1984).
262. See United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d 660, 667 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Fourth Amendment
cases tend to turn on particulars and are often neither blanket authorizations nor blanket
prohibitions.”).
263. Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright
Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 333 (1982) (quoting Robbins v. California,
453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
264. See supra notes 202–203, 227–229 and accompanying text.
265. See Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1038 (“An exception to the Fourth Amendment rule prohibiting
detention absent probable cause must not diverge from its purpose and rationale.”).
266. Id. at 1039.
267. Id. at 1044 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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line will mark the Court’s concerted effort to maintain more narrowly the
contours of detentions of occupants without probable cause.
One could counter that the Bailey Court has placed courts and officers
in a position that will hinder police in executing their duties. As Justice
Scalia noted, however, a search warrant does not “entitle[] the Government
to a concomitant Summers detention.”268 A Summers detention “‘is an
exception—justified by necessity—to a rule that would otherwise render the
[seizure] unlawful.’”269 Officers do not have to seize an occupant on the
immediate vicinity of the premises,270 and lower courts ought not analyze
future cases with the contrary premise in mind. A Summers detention is not
the only means by which to stop a suspect.271
C. Justice Scalia Correctly Clarified the Application and Scope of
Summers When He Addressed the Interest-Balancing Approach of
the Second Circuit
Several courts confronted cases involving off-premises detentions
incident to the execution of a search warrant.272 Because those courts did
not read Summers to state definitively whether the power to detain extended
beyond the premises, however, they generally conducted the traditional
reasonableness inquiry of weighing the intrusion of the individual against
the law enforcement interests at stake.273 The Second Circuit employed this
“interest-balancing approach” in United States v. Bailey as well.274 In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia criticized the Second Circuit for misinterpreting
the application of Summers.275 He clarified that the Summers Court did not
impose “‘an ad hoc determination’” on officers, nor did it require them “‘to
evaluate . . . the quantum of proof justifying detention.’”276 Justice Scalia
recognized that after the Muehler Court revisited Summers, the Summers

268. Id.
269. Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
270. See id. at 1039 (majority opinion) (“If the officers find that it would be dangerous to
detain a departing individual in front of a residence, they are not required to stop him.”).
271. See id. (noting that “where there are grounds to believe the departing occupant is
dangerous, or involved in criminal activity, police will generally not need Summers to detain him
at least for brief questioning, as they can rely instead on Terry”).
272. See supra Part II.C.3.
273. See supra Part II.C.3.
274. See United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031
(2013) (“The guiding principle behind the requirement of reasonableness for detention in such
circumstances is the de minimis intrusion characterized by a brief detention in order to protect the
interests of law enforcement in the safety of the officers and the preservation of evidence.”).
275. Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1043 (Scalia, J., concurring).
276. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981)).
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exception was categorical “within its scope.”277 The application of
Summers, therefore, was a binary, not balancing, inquiry.278 A court only
had to determine whether the detainee was an occupant of the premises
subject to a search warrant.279 If so, then Summers applied.280
One could argue that Justice Scalia obviated the question of how or if
the Summers Court defined “occupant.” Because lower courts, including
the Second Circuit, did not have a workable definition to apply to cases
involving off-premises detentions, they opted to assess the reasonableness
of the detention by weighing competing interests.281 Justice Scalia provided
an answer as to the scope of Summers by applying the majority’s
geographic line to explain the meaning of occupant.282 Thus, the majority
seemed to supply an answer to the question that had been plaguing the
circuits—whether Summers “impose[d] upon police a duty based on
geographic proximity.”283 The majority and Justice Scalia in concurrence
informed officers through Bailey that the “immediate vicinity of the
premises to be searched” marked the scope of that duty.284
Justice Scalia also criticized the Second Circuit’s consideration of
whether the officers had detained Bailey “as soon as practicable.”285 While
Justice Scalia recognized the “appeal” of this inquiry, he explained that it
was ultimately fallacious.286 Justice Scalia reasoned that the issuance of a
search warrant does not per se entitle officers to detain under Summers.287
Rather, a Summers detention is the exception to the rule, “‘justified by
necessity.’”288 For Justice Scalia, that necessity arises out of the law
enforcement interest in “carrying out the search unimpeded by violence or
other disruptions.”289 Furthermore, the necessity arises only in the event
that occupants are present “during the execution of a search warrant.”290

277. Id.; see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (“An officer’s authority to detain
incident to a search is categorical.”).
278. Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1043.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See supra Part II.C.3.
282. Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1043.
283. United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1991).
284. Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1042 (majority opinion).
285. Id. at 1044 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 206
(2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013)).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
289. Id.
290. Id.
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The Cochran Court initiated the pervasive inquiry among the federal
courts of appeals as to whether officers had acted “as soon as
practicable.”291 No balancing inquiry of competing interests, however,
takes into account police performance in this manner. The Summers Court
certainly never recognized this term.292 With respect to the officers,
reasonableness hinges on the interests at stake in the line of duty—
protecting themselves and preserving evidence.293
Justice Scalia
appropriately framed a Summers detention as a limited exception justified
by a narrow interest, not an automatic right available to well-behaved police
officers.
D. The Bailey Court Adopted an Approach Consistent with the Gant
Court—A Concerted Focus on Maintaining an Exception to the
Fourth Amendment Narrowly and Probing the Relevance of Its
Underlying Justifications
The Bailey Court modified and reduced the three law enforcement
interests at stake in Summers—minimizing the risk of harm to the officers,
completing the search, and preventing flight—to the following: “the safe
and efficient execution of [the] search.”294 Justice Scalia went further in his
concurrence to emphasize that officers have an interest not in executing an
efficient search but in “carrying out the search unimpeded by violence or
other disruptions.”295 In both opinions, the Justices stressed that detentions
under Summers were exceptions to be narrowly tailored.296 This emphasis
is not an aberration. By considering Bailey in light of Gant, one can
perceive a concerted effort by the Court not to tolerate existing exceptions,
or grant new ones, if legitimate law enforcement interests do not support
them and the facts do not trigger those law enforcement interests.
The Court in Belton held that officers could search “the passenger
compartment” of a vehicle when they make “a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant” of the vehicle.297 The Belton Court looked to the justifications
for a search incident to arrest in Chimel—safety and evidentiary concerns—
291. See United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he focus is upon
police performance, that is, whether the police detained defendant as soon as practicable after
departing from his residence.”).
292. See generally Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
293. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969) (“No consideration relevant to
the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation, once the search is allowed to go
beyond the area from which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items.”).
294. Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1042 (majority opinion).
295. Id. at 1044 (Scalia, J., concurring).
296. See supra notes 202–203, 227–229 and accompanying text.
297. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
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in reaching this determination.298 The Gant Court, however, was concerned
that many courts had construed the Belton rule broadly to permit searches
“even if there [was] no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the
vehicle at the time of the search.”299 If the arrestee could not legitimately
gain access to the vehicle, then the justifications of officer safety and
evidence preservation were not triggered.300 Consequently, the Gant Court
restricted the scope of a Belton search to “when the arrestee is unsecured
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search.”301
The Gant Court probed the competing interests and concluded that the
broad reading of Belton undermined the individual’s privacy concerns while
not critically protecting or serving officer safety and evidentiary
concerns.302 The Court also concluded that adopting a broad reading of
Belton would inappropriately transform an exception into “a police
entitlement,” which the Court considered an “anathema to the Fourth
Amendment.”303 Finally, Justice Scalia, in concurrence, would have
eliminated the safety concern and confined the scope of reasonable searches
under Belton to only those animated by a search for “evidence of the crime
for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has
probable cause to believe occurred.”304
Similarly, the Bailey Court was concerned that upholding Bailey’s
detention could cause the Summers exception to “diverge from its purpose
and rationale.”305 Like the Gant Court, the Bailey Court sensed that police
had already achieved “far-reaching authority” in detaining occupants under
Summers and Muehler.306 Moreover, the Bailey Court found that the
justifications under Summers were not triggered by the circumstances of
Bailey’s detention.307 Thus, the Court similarly decided to impose a
condition on officers for the detention to be reasonable—they would have
to detain the occupant within the immediate vicinity of the premises.308
Justice Scalia agreed with the condition the majority imposed, but would

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 457–58.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341 (2009).
See id. at 343 (articulating the broad reading of Belton that the Court sought to reject).
Id.
Id. at 344–48.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (2013).
Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1042.
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have circumscribed the holding further.309 Like the Gant Court, Justice
Scalia stressed in Bailey that officers were not entitled to the authority in
question and only could use it in very narrow circumstances.310
One may ask how the Court will approach the next case involving a
detention incident to the execution of a search warrant. Justice Breyer
argued in dissent that the Bailey Court’s line of reasoning could promote
uncertainty among the lower courts,311 uncertainty that could likely trigger a
case before the Court on the meaning of “immediate vicinity.” Or perhaps
the Court will first face another controversy over the manner or duration of
a detention under Summers and Muehler. However Bailey arises in a future
case before the Supreme Court, the Bailey opinion provides valuable insight
into how the Court treats Fourth Amendment issues, rules, and exceptions.
The Court has demonstrated that it is willing to chisel away at the
justifications underlying its exceptions, is attentive in appraising the facts of
the case alongside the purported justifications, and is insistent that officers
not undertake their roles with the assumption that a search or a detention is
a government right. In Bailey, the Court was careful to maintain control of
an exception to traditional Fourth Amendment rules.
V. CONCLUSION
In Bailey v. United States, the Court concluded that a detention under
Summers could not occur beyond “the immediate vicinity of the premises to
be searched” without violating the Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness.312 This spatial line nevertheless supplies police with
adequate power to detain, power underpinned by a more appropriate
justification than that in Summers.313 The Court also communicated this
line to lower courts with enough flexibility to ensure that it would not
collapse under the particulars of a given case.314 Justice Scalia assisted
lower courts by articulating the proper application and scope of Summers to
ensure courts do not permit a theory that officers possess a government
right to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant; rather, this
power to detain is an exceptional grant of narrow authority.315 The Court in
Bailey, as it had in Gant, focused on ensuring that an exception granting

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 1043–44 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1044; see supra text accompanying note 303.
Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1047 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1042–43 (majority opinion).
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
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police power was narrow and justified by relevant law enforcement
interests.316

316. See supra Part IV.D.

